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Abstract: Signcryption is a cryptographic primitive which performs encryption and signature in a 
single logical step. In conventional signcryption only receiver of the signcrypted text can verify the 
authenticity of the origin i.e. signature of the sender on the message after decrypting the cipher text. In 
public verifiable signcryption scheme anyone can verify the authenticity of the origin who can access 
the signcrypted text i.e. signature of the sender on the cipher text. Public verifiable signcryption 
scheme in which the receiver can convince a third party, by providing additional information other 
than his private key along with the signcryption is called third party verifiable signcryption schemes. 
In this paper we proposed an efficient identity based public verifiable signcryption scheme with third 
party verification and proved its security in the random oracle model.   
Keywords: signcryption, public verifiable signcryption, identity based cryptography, provable 
security. 
1. Introduction: The main advantages of public key cryptography are encryption and digital 
signature, used to achieve confidentiality and authenticity of a message respectively. There are 
scenarios where both primitives are needed (for example secure e-mailing). Earlier signature-then-
encryption approach was followed to achieve both primitives. However, this approach has high 
computational cost and communication overhead. In 1997, Zheng [17] proposed a novel cryptographic 
primitive “Signcryption” which achieves both confidentiality and authenticity in a single logical step 
with the cost significantly lower than ‘signature-then-encryption’ approach. In 2002, Beak et al. [1] 
first formalize and define security notions for signcryption via semantic security against adaptive 
chosen cipher text attack and existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attack. Many 
public key signcryption schemes have been proposed after [17]. Some of them are [2, 9, 10, 18]. 
 Identity based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [15] in 1984. In the identity based 
cryptosystem public key of users are their identities (e.g. email address, PAN number etc.) and secret 
keys of users are created by a trusted third party called private key generator (PKG). First identity 
based signature scheme was given by Shamir [15] in 1984, but the first identity based encryption 
scheme was given by Boneh and Franklin [5] in 2001. The first identity based signcryption scheme 
was proposed by Malone Lee [12] in 2002. They also gave the security model for signcryption in 
identity based setting. Since then, many identity based signcryption schemes have been proposed in 
literature [3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13]. Their main objective is to reduce the computational complexity and to 
design the more efficient identity based signcryption scheme. 
 In conventional signcryption the sender signs the message which is hide it the receiver’s public 
key. Thus only the receiver can decrypt the message using his/her private key and can verify the 
authenticity of the cipher text. In the case when receiver wants to prove that indeed the sender has 
signed the message to a third party then he/she has to reveal his/her private key. In public verifiable 
signcryption scheme a third party who is unaware of the receiver’s private key is able to verify 
whether a cipher text is valid or not. Public verifiable signcryption schemes have applications in 
filtering out the spam in a secure email system and private contract signing [14]. In third party 
verifiable signcryption schemes, a third party is able to verify the integrity and origin of the message 
using some additional information along with the signcryption provided by the receiver other than 
his/her private key. Recently in 2010, Selvi et al. [14] showed attacks on confidentiality and 
unforgeability of the Chow et al. [8] identity based signcryption scheme, which was the only identity 
based signcryption scheme that provides both public verifiability and third party verification. In [14] 
2 
 
Selvi et al. proposed a new identity based signcryption scheme with public verifiability and third party 
verification and suggested a modification in security notions by providing an additional oracle called 
third party verifiable (TP-Verify) oracle to the adversary. In this paper we propose an efficient identity 
based public verifiable signcryption scheme with third party verification and forward security. Also in 
the security model of [14] TP-Verify oracle does not provide any advantage to the adversary as it is 
already embedded in the IBPUSC oracle. Also in the proof of Theorem 1 [14], the simulation of TP-
Verify oracle depends on the IBPUSC oracle. Thus we consider the security notions for identity based 
signcryption proposed in [6, 12]. 
 This paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we define identity based signcryption scheme 
with public verifiability and third party verification and its security model. Section 3 contains the 
preliminaries for the proposed scheme. In section 4, we give the construction of IBPSC scheme and in 
section 5 we give the security results for our scheme under the security model defined in section 2. In 
section 6 we compare our scheme with the existing identity based signcryption schemes with similar 
properties. We conclude this paper in section 7. 
2. Identity Based Public Verifiable Signcryption (IBPSC): 
 An identity based public verifiable signcryption (IBPSC) scheme consists of the following 
algorithms: 
1. Setup: This algorithm takes input a security parameter k and outputs the system parameters 
params and a master secret key. 
2. Key Generation: Given input params, master secret key and a user’s identity UID , it outputs a 
partial private key UD  corresponding to UID . 
3. IBPSC: To send a message m  from a user A  to B , this algorithm takes input 
( , , , )A A BD m ID ID  and outputs a ( , , , )  A A BIBPSC D m ID ID . 
4. IBPUSC: This algorithm takes input ( , , , )B B AD ID ID and outputs m  and   if   is a valid 
signcryption of m  done by A for B, otherwise outputs “invalid” if   is not valid. 
5. TP-Verify: This algorithm takes input ( , , ) A BID ID and outputs “Valid”, if   is a valid 
signcryption of m  done by A for B, otherwise “invalid”, if   is not valid. 
Security model for IBPSC:  
2.1. Message Confidentiality: 
 The notion of security with respect to confidentiality is indistinguishability of encryptions 
under adaptive chosen cipher text attack (IND-IBPSC-CCA2). For IBPSC this notion is captured by 
the following game played between challenger   and adversary  . 
GAME 1 (IND-IBPSC-CCA2): 
Initialization:    runs the setup algorithm on input a security parameter k, gives public parameters 
params to the adversary  .   keeps the master key secret. 
Queries (Find Stage): The adversary  makes the following queries adaptively. 
 Hash Queries:    can request the hash values of any input and   responds with appropriate 
hash values. 
 Key generation Queries:    submits an identity UID  and   computes the private key UD  
corresponding to UID  and returns to  . 
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 IBPSC Queries:    submits two identities AID , BID  and a message m. Challenger   runs 
IBPSC algorithm with message m and identities AID  and BID  and returns the output   to the 
adversary  .  
 IBPUSC Queries:    submits two identities AID , BID  along with   to the challenger  .   
runs the IBPUSC algorithm with input  , AID  and BID  and returns the output m and   if   
is a valid signcryption of m  done by A for B, otherwise outputs “invalid” if   is not valid.  
 No queries with A BID ID  is allowed. 
Challenge: At the end of find stage,    submits two distinct messages 0m  and 1m  of equal length, a 
sender’s identity *AID  and a receiver’s identity 
*
BID  on which   wishes to be challenged. The 
adversary   must have made no key generation query on *BID .    picks randomly a bit {0,1}b , 
runs the IBPSC algorithm with message bm  under 
*
AID  and 
*
BID  and returns the output *  to the 
adversary  . 
Queries (Guess stage):    queries adaptively again as in the find stage. It is not allowed to extract 
the private key corresponding to *BID  and also it is not allowed to make an IBPUSC query on *  
with sender *AID  and receiver 
*
BID . 
Eventually,    outputs a bit 'b and wins the game if 'b b . 
 ’s advantage is defined as 2 2Pr[ '] 1    IND IBPSC CCAAdv b b .  
Definition 1: An IBPSC scheme is said to IND-IBPSC-CCA2 secure if no polynomially bounded 
adversary   has non-negligible advantage of winning the above game. 
 Note that the confidentiality game described above deals with the insider security since the 
adversary is given access to the private key of sender *AID  in the challenge. 
2.2. Cipher text unforgeability:  
 The notion of security with respect to authenticity is existential unforgeability against chosen 
message attacks (EUF-IBPSC-CMA). For IBPSC this notion is captured by the following game played 
between challenger   and adversary  . 
GAME 2 (EUF-IBPSC-CMA): 
Initialization: Same as in GAME 1. 
Queries: The adversary  asks a polynomially bounded number of queries adaptively as in GAME 1. 
Forgery: Finally,    produces a triplet * *( , , )A BID ID 
  that was not obtained from IBPSC query 
during the game and for which private key of *AID  was not exposed. The forger wins if 
  is valid 
signcrypted text from AID
  to BID
 . 
 The adversary  ’s advantage is its probability of winning the above game. 
Definition 3: An IBPSC scheme is said to EUF-IBPSC-CMA secure if no polynomially bounded 
adversary   has non-negligible advantage of winning the above game. 
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 Note that in the cipher text unforgeability game described above deals with the insider security 
since the adversary is given access to the private key of receiver *BID  in the forgery. 
3. Preliminaries: 
Let 1  be an additive group and 2 be a multiplicative group both of the same prime order p . A 
function 1 1 2:e      is called a bilinear pairing if it satisfies the following properties: 
1. *1, , , , ( , ) ( , )
ab
pP Q a b e aP bQ e P Q       
2. For any 1P  , there is 1Q , such that ( , ) 1e P Q   
3. There exists an efficient algorithm to compute 1( , ) ,e P Q P Q  . 
Given a ( 1)q   tupple 2( , , ,..., )qP aP a P a P  to compute 1 2( , )
ae P P   is known as q-Bilinear Diffie 
Hellman inversion problem (q-BDHIP) [4]. 
Given *1 1 1
1
1 1, , ,..., , ,...,  
 
 q R p
q
P xP h h P P
h x h x
 where * R px  is unknown and q  is an 
integer, to compute 1

P
h x
 for some * ph but 1{ ,..., } qh h h  is known as strong q-Collision Attack 
Assumption problem (q-CAAP) [16]. 
4. Proposed IBPSC Scheme: 
Setup: Given a security parameter 1k , the PKG chooses two groups 1  and 2  of prime order 
2 kp , a random generator P of 1 , and a bilinear map 1 1 2:e     , Computes ( , )g e P P , 
define hash functions as 3 *1 :{0,1}
k
pH  , 1 2 2 1 3 22 22 :{0,1} {0,1}    n n k k k nH , 
2 1 1 22
3 :{0,1} {0,1}
 k k n nH , 1 2 1 32 24 :{0,1}
  n n k kH 1 , where 1 2,k k  and 3k  denote the number of 
bits to represent elements of 1 , 2  and identity respectively and 1n  is the message bit length and 2n  
is the number of bits concatenated to message. PKG chooses random *ps  as the master secret key 
and sets pubP sP . PKG publishes the system parameters as params = 1 2 1, , , , , ,  pubp n P P  
1 1 2 1 2 3 4: , , , , ,e g H H H H    . 
Key Generation: Given a user U with identity UID , the private key is computed by PKG as 
1
1( ( ) )
 U UD H ID s P . Also 1( ) U U pubQ H ID P P . 
IBPSC: The sender A for the receiver B 
1. Chooses *R pr  ; 
2. Computes  
i. 
1


 rg  
ii. 1 BR r Q  and  AS rQ  
iii. 2( , , , , , )  A BH m R S ID ID  
iv. 3( , , )  c m H R S  
v. 4( , , , , ) A BH H c R S ID ID  
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vi.   AT rH D  
3. Returns the signcrypted text ( , , , )  c R S T . 
IBPUSC: On receiving   from A, the user B 
1. Computes 4 ( , , , , )  A BH H c R S ID ID  
2. If ( , ) ( , )Ae T Q e H S g  returns “invalid”. Otherwise computes 
i. ( , )   Be R D  
ii. 3( , , )    m c H R S  
iii. 2( , , , , , )   A BH m R S ID ID  
3. If    returns “invalid”. Otherwise returns m  and ( , , , )      m . 
TP-Verify: On receiving   and ,A BID ID , Third party  
1. Computes 3( , , ) 
   m c H R S  
2. Accept   and output valid iff 2 ( , , , , , ) 
   A BH m R S ID ID  and  
  . Otherwise outputs 
“invalid”. 
 
 Note that in the proposed scheme ( , , )R S T  can be seen as the signature of the sender A on the 
cipher text c, which can be verified without the knowledge of receiver’s private key. Thus the 
proposed identity based signcryption scheme achieves public verifiability. Also it is forward secure as 
the knowing of sender’s private key does not help to decrypt the cipher text. 
Consistency: 
                           
11
1( , ) ( , ) ( ( ) , )
r
B B B B pub Be R D e r Q D e H ID P P D
     
                                             
1 1 11
1 1(( ( ) ) , ( ( ) ) ) ( , )
r r r
B Be H ID s P H ID s P e P P g
        
                  ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )A A A A A A Ae T Q e rH D Q e rH Q e D Q e H rQ e P P e H S g      
5. Security Results: 
Theorem 1: (Message confidentiality) Assume that an IND-IBPSC-CCA2 adversary   has an 
advantage   against the proposed IBPSC scheme when running in time  , asking 
ihq queries to 
random oracle ( 1, 2,3,4)iH i   and ,e uq q  IBPSC queries, IBPUSC queries respectively. Then there is 
an algorithm   to solve the q-BDHIP for 
1hq q  with probability 
2 4
2
1 3
( )1' 1 1
( ) 2 22
h e e h
u n k k
h h e
q q q q
q
q q q


     
             
 
within a time 
1 4
2
exp' (2 ) ( 3 ) ( )u p h h e multi eO q O q q q O q           where exp , multi  and p  are 
the time for an exponentiation in 2 , multiplication in 1  and for a pairing computation. 
Proof: Let   be an IND-IBPSC-CCA2 adversary against the proposed IBPSC scheme with 
advantage  . We will show how adversary  is used to construct a simulator   that extract 
1( , ) ae P P  on input 2( , , , ..., )qP aP a P a P . 
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 We will proceed similarly as in [3]. In the preparation phase, first   selects 
1
{1,..., }R hq , 
elements *R p   , *1 2 1 1, , ..., , ,..., q R p          and expand the polynomial 
1,( ) ( )
q
ii ig x x      to obtain the coefficients 
*
1 2 1, , ...., q R pc c c     such that 10( ) q iiig x c x  . 
  also computes *i i p      for 1,..., 1, 1, ...,i q    . 
Now   sets 10 ( ) ( )
q i
iiG c a P g a P

   as a public generator of 1  and computes another 
element 1U   as 11 ( )q iiiU c a P aG  . Note that   does not know a. Further   computes 
2
0
( )( )
( )
q i
i ii
i
g xg x d x
x 

  
 
for 1,..., 1, 1, ...,i q    such that  
2
0
1 ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
q i
i ii
i i
g aG g a P d a P
a a 

    
. 
 Thus   can compute 
1
1 1hq q    pairs 
1,i i
i
S G
a


 
  
 by the last term of the above 
equation. The system wide public key pubP  is chosen as ( )pubP U G a G         with 
(unknown) private key *pz a      . For all 1,..., 1, 1, ...,i q    ,   has ( , )i iS    
1( , )i
i
G
z

 
. 
 Now simulator   start the interaction with   on input 1 2 1, , , , , ,pubp n G P   
1 1 2 1 2 3 4: , , , , ,e g H H H H     where ( , )g e G G  and pubP zP .   asks queries to   
throughout the simulation. It is assumed that 1H  queries are distinct and any query involving the 
identity ID comes after a 1H  query on ID. The target identity 
*
BID  is submitted to 1H  at some point of 
simulation. Also to maintain consistency in queries,    makes the lists iL  for random oracle iH  for 
1, 2,3, 4i  .   initializes a counter   to 1 and start answering  ’s queries as follow: 
 
 1H  queries: it takes input an identity ID.   answers   to the 
th one such query and 
increment .   sets the identity  ID  as ID  and store the tuple ( , )ID   to 1L  list. 
 2H  queries: it takes input ( , , , , , )m R S ID ID  .   checks the list 2L , it returns a previous 
value if it exists. Otherwise it chooses a random 22 {0,1}
n
Rh   and returns this value as the 
answer.   stores the tuple 2( , , , , , , )m R S ID ID h   in the 2L  list. 
 3H  queries: it takes input ( , , )R S .   checks the list 3L , it returns a previous value if it 
exists. Otherwise it chooses a random 1 23 {0,1}
n n
Rh
  and returns this value as the answer.    
stores the tuple 3( , , , )R S h  in the 3L  list. 
 4H  queries: it takes input ( , , , , )c R S ID ID  .   checks the list 4L , it returns a previous value 
if it exists. Otherwise it chooses a random *R pv   and returns 4 1h vQ   as the answer. 
  stores the tuple 4( , , , , , , )c R S ID ID v h   in the 4L  list. 
 Key generation queries: it takes input an identity ID .   fails if     and aborts the 
simulation. Otherwise it knows that 1( )IDH    from 1L  list and returns 
1D G
z 


. 
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 IBPSC queries: it takes input a plaintext m and identities ( , )ID ID   where , {1,..., }ihq   . 
If    ,   knows the private key of ID  is D  and can answer the query by following the 
specification of IBPSC algorithm. So we assume that    , then   does the following: 
i. Chooses *, , R pr t v   
ii. Computes 
1 1, , ,rg R r Q S vP T tP
      
iii. Simulates 2 2( , , , , , )H m R S ID ID h   and stores the tuple 2( , , , , , , )m R S ID ID h   in 
the 2L  list. 
iv. Simulates 3 3( , , )H R S h   and stores the tuple 3( , , , )R S h  in 3L  list. 
v. Computes 2 3c m h h   
vi. Sets 14 1( , , , , ) ( )H c R S ID ID v tQ P
      and stores the tuple ( , , , , , ,c R S ID ID    
1
4 ( ))h v tQ P
   in 4L  list. 
vii. Returns the signcryption ( , , , )c R S T   
 
 Also   fails if 4H  is already defined but this happens with a probability smaller than 
4
( ) 2ke hq q . 
 
 IBPUSC queries: it takes input a signcrypted text ( , , , )c R S T   a sender’s identity ID  and 
a receiver’s identity ID . If ID ID    then   knows private key of ID  is D .   runs the 
IBPUSC algorithm normally and returns the output to  . If ID ID   , then   searches the 
4L  list for the entry 4( , , , , , , )c R S ID ID v h  . If such an entry does not exist then   returns 
invalid, otherwise it computes ( , )e T Q  and 4( , )e h S g  where ( , )g e G G . If  ( , )e T Q   
4( , )e h S g ,   returns invalid, otherwise for each tuple 3,( , , , )i iR S h  in 3L  list   computes 
3,i i im c h    and searches the 2L  list for the tuple 2,( , , , , , , )i i im R S ID ID h  . If 2,i ih   
for any i,   returns “invalid”, otherwise returns ( , , , )i i im    . 
 
Across the whole game the probability to incorrectly reject the signcrypted text at some 
moment of the simulation is bounded by 2
2
1
22
h
u n k
q
q
 
 
 
. 
At the end of challenge phase,    outputs two messages 0 1,m m  and identities * *,A BID ID  such 
that she has not made Key generation query on *BID . If 
*  BID ID ,   aborts the simulation. 
Otherwise it picks *R p   , 1 2{0,1}n nRc   and 1, RS T    to return the challenge * ( , , , )c R S T   
where 1R G   . If we define 1 a    and since z a     , we can check that  
1 1 1 1( ) pubR G a G z G G P      
             
  cannot recognize that *  is not a valid signcrypted text unless she queries 3H  with input 
1
( , )e G G 

. Also in the guess stage, her view is simulated as before and her eventual output is ignored. 
Standard arguments can show that a successful   is very likely to query 3H  with input 
1
( , )e G G 

 if 
the simulation is indistinguishable from a real attack environment. 
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 To produce a result,    fetches a random record from 3L  list. As 3L  contains no more than 
3
( )h eq q  records by construction thus with probability 
3
1
( )h eq q
,   chooses the record which will 
contain the right element 
1 2( ) /( , ) ( , )g a ae G G e P P 

  where ( )G g a P . 
The q-BDHIP solution can be extracted as follows, if 1/* ( , ) ae P P   then  
2
0 2 21/
1 0 10 0( , ) ( *) ( ( ), ) ( , ( ))
q qca i j
i ji je G G e c a P c P e G c a P
 
      
 In an analysis of  ’s advantage, following events will cause  to abort the simulation: 
1E :   does not choose to be challenge on ID  
2E : a Key generation query is made on ID  
3E :   aborts in IBPSC query because of a collision on 4H  
4E :   rejects a valid signcrypted text at some point of the game 
 
 We clearly have probability 
11Pr[ ] 1/ hE q   and we know that 1E  implies 2E . Also 
43Pr[ ] ( ) / 2
k
e e hE q q q   and 2
24
1Pr[ ]
22
h
u n k
q
E q
 
  
 
. Thus we find that  
2 4
2
1
1 3 4
( )1 1Pr[ ] 1 1
2 22
h e e h
u n k k
h
q q q q
E E E q
q
     
               
 
Also the probability that   select the correct record from 4L  list is 
3
1
( )h eq q
. Therefore advantage 
of   is 
2 4
2
1 3
( )1' 1 1
( ) 2 22
h e e h
u n k k
h h e
q q q q
q
q q q


     
             
. 
The time bound is obtained as there are 
1
2
4( 3 )h eO q q q   multiplications in preparation phase, 
(2 )uO q  pairing computations and ( )eO q  exponentiations in 2 . 
Theorem 2 (Cipher text Unforgeability): Assume that an EUF-IBPSC-CMA adversary   has an 
advantage   against the proposed IBPSC scheme when running in time  , asking 
ihq queries to 
random oracle ( 1, 2,3,4)iH i   and ,e uq q  IBPSC queries, IBPUSC queries respectively. Then there is 
an algorithm   to solve the q-CAA problem for 
1
1hq q   with probability 
2 4
2
1 3
( )1 1 1' 1 1
( )2 2 22
h e e h
uk n k k
h h e
q q q q
q
q q q
 
                       
 
within a time 
1 4
2
exp' (2( 1) ( 3 ) ( )u p h h e multi eO q O q q q O q            where exp , multi  and p  
are same as in theorem 1. 
Proof: Let   be the EUF-IBPSC-CMA adversary against the proposed IBPSC scheme with 
advantage  . We will show how adversary   is used to construct a simulator   that solve the q-
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CAA problem given input 1,P sP  (s is unknown), *1,..., q R p     and 1
1
1 1,...,
q
P P
s s 

 
  
i.e.   outputs a pair 1( , )P
s

 
 for 1{ ,..., }q    where 1 1hq q  . 
 Simulator   starts interaction with   on input 1 2 1 1 1 2, , , , , , : ,pubp n P P e        
1 2 3 4, , , ,g H H H H  where pubP sP  and ( , )g e P P .   asks queries throughout the simulation. It is 
assumed that 1H  queries are distinct and any query involving the identity ID comes after a 1H  query 
on ID. Also   makes list iL  for random oracle , 1, 2,3, 4iH i   to maintain consistency in queries as in 
theorem 1.   randomly picks 
1
{1,..., }R hq  and start answering  ’s queries as follows: 
1H queries: It takes input an identity ID.   answers 1{ ,..., }q    to th  one such query and  
increment  .   sets the identity as ID  and store the tuple 
1( , , )ID P
s  

 
 in 1L  list. If    ,   
returns a value *R p    such that 1{ ,..., }q   .  sets the identity as ID  and store the tuple 
( , , )ID     in 1L  list. 
, ,2 3 4H H H  queries:   answers these queries similarly as in theorem 1. 
Key Generation queries: It takes input an identity ID .   fails if     and aborts the simulation. 
Otherwise   checks the list 1L  to find the entry 
1( , , )ID P
s  

 
 and returns 1D P
s 


 as 
corresponding private key. 
IBPSC, IBPUSC queries:   answers these queries similarly as in theorem 1. 
 At the end of the game, the forger   halts and outputs a signcrypted text ( , , , )c R S T       
and two identities AID
  and BID
  such that    is not the output of IBPSC oracle with a sender’s 
identity AID
  and a receiver’s identity BID
 . If AID ID
   ,   aborts the simulation. Otherwise   
searches the 4L  list for the tuple 
* * *
4( , , , , , , )Bc R S ID ID v h v Q
      such that 
4( , ) ( , ) ( , )e T Q e h S e P P
    
with 4h v Q
    for some known elements 
*
pv
 . Then we have  
( , ) ( , )
( , ( ) ) ( , )
e T v S Q e P P
e T v S s P e P P
  
  
 
  


 
Thus ( )( )s T v S P      . Hence   can successfully compute
1 P T v S
s
   

 and output the 
pair 1( , )P
s

  
 for 1{ ,..., }q    as a solution of k-CAA problem in 1 . 
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 The probability for   to output a valid forgery ( , , , )c R S T       without asking the 
corresponding * * *4 ( , , , , )BH c R S ID ID

  query is at most 1 2
k . 
 Further the following events will cause  to abort the simulation: 
1E :   does not choose to be challenge on ID  
2E : a Key generation query is made on ID  
3E :   aborts in IBPSC query because of a collision on 4H  
4E :   rejects a valid signcrypted text at some point of the game 
  
 The analysis of the  ’s advantage is similar as in theorem 1. Therefore advantage of   is 
2 4
2
1 3
( )1 1 1' 1 1
( )2 2 22
h e e h
uk n k k
h h e
q q q q
q
q q q
 
                       
. 
The time bound is obtained as there are 
1
2
4( 3 )h eO q q q   multiplications in preparation phase, 
(2( 1))uO q   pairing computations and ( )eO q  exponentiations in 2 . 
 
6. Efficiency and Comparison: 
 Chow et al. [8] scheme was the only identity based signcryption scheme that provides both 
public verifiability and third party verification and supported by security proof. Recently, Selvi et al. 
[14] showed attacks on confidentiality and unforgeability of [8] and proposed a new identity based 
signcryption scheme with public verifiability and third party verification. Thus in the following table 
we compare our scheme with [14]. Clearly in the proposed scheme only three pairing computations are 
needed in the unsigncryption phase and no pairing calculation is needed in signcryption phase. 
 
Signcryption Unsigncryption 
Scheme 
  mul in 
1  
exps in 
2  e cps 
mul in 
1  
exps in 
2  e cps 
Selvi et al. [14] 2 1 1 0 0 4 
Proposed IBPSC 3 1 0 0 0 3 
 
Table 1 
 
7. Conclusion:  In this paper we proposed an efficient identity based signcryption scheme with public 
verifiability and third party verification. In the proposed scheme only three pairing computations are 
needed in the unsigncryption phase and no pairing calculation is needed in signcryption phase. We 
compare our scheme with the existing identity based signcryption schemes with similar properties. We 
also gave the proofs of security based on q-BDHIP and q-CAA problem in the random oracle model. 
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